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We study the fiscal consequences of deflation on a panel of 17 economies in the first wave of 
globalization, between 1870 and 1914. By means of impulse response analyses and panel regressions, 
we find that a 1 percent fall in the price level leads to an increase in the public debt ratio of about 0.23-
0.32 pp. and accounting for trade openness, monetary policy and the exchange rate raises the absolute 
value of the coefficient on deflation. Moreover, the public debt ratio increases when deflation is also 
associated with a period of economic recession. For government revenue, lagged deflation comes out 
with a statistically significant negative coefficient, while government primary expenditure seems 
relatively invariant to changes in prices. 
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The economic problems associated with deflation are traditionally linked with sluggish GDP growth 
and/or economic recessions. Fisher (1933) first mentioned the idea of debt deflation where falling price 
levels would increase outstanding debt values in real terms. This paper contributes to the 
understanding of the consequences of deflation for an array of fiscal aggregates, between the end of the 
19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, just before the start of World War I. Such analysis 
can provide important information for policymakers at any point in time. Firstly, deflation is linked 
with mechanical surges in debt-to-GDP ratios as it comprises of pre-existing stocks plus its term 
structure, which, together with downward rigidities in sovereign interest rates, tend to additionally 
compound the rise of both debt market value and debt ratios. Secondly, deflation also affects the 
budget balance by impacting government revenues and primary government expenditures. Current 
literature on the consequences of deflation on fiscal aggregates is scarce.1 In contrast, several papers 
have looked at the corresponding effects of high inflation2 or the reverse direction, i.e., the effect of 
fiscal policy on price dynamics.3 Finally, other studies have also analyzed the impact of falling prices 
and its economic costs.4  
In the context of our historical timespan we need to be aware that total public spending was only 
around 10% of GNP in most countries, while pensions and cash transfers were practically non-existent 
and income taxes still did not exist for much of the period under scrutiny, nor did general sales taxes 
(see Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). Moreover, the gold standard was prevalent and determining 
exchange rates and, because of the intensifying industrial revolution, the prices of many products were 
falling before the occurrence of any productivity gains. 
                                                 
1 Existing studies on deflation have looked more at the role of fiscal policy to boost aggregate demand aiming at exiting 
from a deflationary episode (Auerbach and Obstfeld, 2004; Cochrane, 2011). To our knowledge, End et al. (2015) is the 
only study that recently took a long-term view on the effects of deflation on fiscal outcomes by supposedly exploring a set 
of 21 countries between 1850 and 2013 (in reality they only look at 18 countries as enumerated in their footnote 27). 
2 Olivera (1967) and Tanzi (1977) find that double-digit inflation tends to deteriorate government budget deficits in real 
terms due to lags in tax collections. Aghevli and Kahn (1978) and Heller (1980) further study the links between fiscal 
policy and inflation in the context of  developing economies.  
3 Catao and Terrones (2005) looked at a  panel of 107 countries between 1960 and 2001 and highlighted a robust positive 
relationship between budget deficits and inflation among high-inflation and developing country groups, but not among low-
inflation advanced economies. Afonso and Jalles (2016, forthcoming) use SURE estimation methods to assess the link 
between prices, bond yields and the fiscal behavior. One of their results is that improvements in the fiscal stance lead to 
persistent falls in sovereign yields and higher sovereign yields are reflected in upward price movements. 
4 Se notably, DeLong (1999), Furhrer and Tootell (2003), while Svensson (2003) also discusses the intricacies of deflation 
and fiscal policies. 
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In this paper, we empirically assess the impact of deflation and low inflation episodes on several 
fiscal aggregates by looking at a sample of 17 countries in the first wave of globalization, that is, 
between 1870 and 1914. We also take a positive approach to our empirical question and do not aim to 
address the issue related to the optimal fiscal response to deflation. Our main contributions to the 
literature are three-fold: i) building a novel dataset for the period at hand; ii) providing short- and 
medium-term analyses via the estimation of impulse response functions directly from local projections; 
iii) coming up with a long-run assessment of the question at hands via panel estimations. 
By means of impulse response analyses and panel regressions our results show that: i) a 1 percent 
fall in prices leads to an increase in the debt ratio of about 0.23-0.32 pp accounting for trade openness, 
monetary policy and the exchange rate raises the absolute value of the coefficient on deflation. 
Moreover, the debt ratio increases when deflation is also associated with an economic recession. 
Indeed: ii) for revenues, lagged deflation comes out with a statistically significant negative coefficient, 
while government primary expenditure seems relatively invariant to changes in prices; iii) countries 
with better institutions do not see their debt ratios rise following a decline in prices while it increases 
when deflation is also associated with an economic recession.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the theoretical 
background. Section 3 develops the empirical methodology and section 4 presents the data. Section 5 
presents and discusses the main results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background  
Price dynamics affect fiscal policy on several dimensions. Let us begin with public debt-to-GDP-
ratio. For a given country i at time t, we can mathematically represent the governing the dynamics of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, by means of the following equation:5 
 1(1 )t t t tdebt debt pbalλ −= + −  (1) 
where ( )/ (1 )t r g gλ = − + , with r denoting to the real interest rate in period t and g the real GDP 
growth rate between t-1 and t. Note that [(1 )/ (1 )] 1 1 (1 )(1 )t t t t t tr i i rπ π= + + − ⇔ + = + +  where ,t ti π  
corresponding to the nominal interest rate in period t and the change in the GDP deflator between t-1 
                                                 




and t, respectively. In addition, 1 (1 )(1 )t t tgγ π+ = + +  with tγ being the nominal GDP growth rate 
between t-1 and t. Hence, Equation (1) is rewritten as: 
        (2) 
 
It follows from Equation (2) that for any given debt stock and real GDP growth rates, deflation 
mechanically increases the debt-to-GDP ratio. Firstly, it lowers nominal GDP, therefore raising the 
ratio upwards. Secondly, the primary balance may worsen unexpectedly in an environment marked by 
deflation, leading to an additional increase in the debt burden. Thirdly, for any given level of nominal 
interest and real GDP growth rates, deflation increases the real value of the overall interest bill. If we 
have sticky interest rates or deflation is unanticipated, then nominal rates will not adjust immediately 
to absorb the shock. Generally speaking, government interest payments are mostly based on 
contractual interest rates, which are essentially fixed and, hence, do not adjust rapidly nor fully in the 
short run to fluctuations in domestic prices.6 
In addition, deflation can affect primary budget balances through its impact on both government 
revenue and expenditure.  
On the revenue side, deflation would not affect the revenue-to-GDP ratio if the tax system would 
be characterized by full proportionality: the different GDP components would be similarly taxed and 
the adjustments in the numerator and denominator would cancel one another. In practical terms, 
however, the tax system includes several distortionary features, which means that deflation will in fact 
alter revenue-to-GDP ratios (End et al., 2015). Two situations are possible. On the one hand, the 
revenue-to-GDP ratio can go down due to the immediate loss of seigniorage revenue (which under a 
fiat money system without monetary policy is equivalent to an implicit inflation tax) for any given 
level of real money balances, therefore creating a “deflation subsidy”. Moreover, the lack of perfect 
indexation mechanisms for movements in the price level, results in a movement of tax payers’ 
positions between the different tax brackets, which subsequently impact the amount of collected 
revenue (Hirao and Aguirre, 1970). In addition, revenue-to-GDP ratios are likely to suffer from 
deflation if tax exemptions are widespread, since these are usually expressed in nominal terms. On the 
other hand, deflation can facilitate the increase in the revenue-to-GDP ratio if central banks react to 
                                                 
6 The impact of this channel is a function of the maturity structure of the sovereign debt as well as its currency 
denomination and the share of price-indexed bonds in the total debt (Akitoby et al., 2014). 
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deflationary pressures by means of quantitative easing policies aimed at producing seignorage revenue 
(assuming that deflation leads to an increase in real money balances holdings, which expand the 
effective taxable base). Furthermore, given that, for example, excises revenues are generally inelastic 
to price fluctuations, their fall will in principle push up their ratio with respect to GDP. Lastly, since 
prices change faster than wages, consumers reallocate their traditional basket of goods by increasing 
the purchases of higher scale products, which are usually more heavily taxed. Similarly, if the GDP 
deflator falls quicker than consumption prices, the revenue ratio will increase.7  
On the expenditure side, its components tend to be stickier than those of revenues, given the 
nominal rigidities embedded in their design and the political difficulties in making cuts to some of 
them when prices fall (e.g. public wages or transfers such as pensions and other social benefits). This 
means that the only politically feasible solution to deflation episodes is an immediate freeze in nominal 
components, leading to a rise in the corresponding ratios-to-GDP. Finally, given that budgets are 
normally prepared and executed in nominal terms, it is usually hard to adjust quickly the spending 
items to unexpected changes in the fiscal forecasts for a given fiscal year. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
We follow two main empirical approaches. The first aims to inspect the short and medium-term 
effects of deflationary episodes on fiscal aggregates by means of impulse response functions obtained 
via the local projection method. The second takes a longer run focus, by estimating a series of panel 
regressions. 
 
a) Local Projection Method 
To estimate the impact of deflation episodes on fiscal aggregates over the short and medium-term, 
we rely on the local projection method popularized by Jorda (2005). For each future period k, the 
following regression is estimated on annual data: 
 (3) 
 
with k=1,…,5 (in years) and where Y represents one of our fiscal dependent variables, namely public 
debt, total government revenues, primary expenditure and primary balance (all expressed in percent of 
                                                 




GDP);  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 at the beginning of a deflationary episode and zero 
otherwise8, in country i at time t;  are country fixed effects; are time effects; and  measures 
the impact of  for each future period k.  In our estimations we set the lag length (l) to two (note, 
however, that results are very robust to other lag structures). We use the panel-corrected standard error 
(PCSE) estimator by Beck and Katz (1995) to estimate equation (3). 
The IRFs are obtained by plotting the resulting estimates for  for k= 1,…,5, and the 
corresponding confidence interval is computed by means of the standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients . Note that, according to Nickell (1981), the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
and fixed effects can bias the estimation of  and in small samples. That said, since the finite 
sample bias is equal to 1/45 in our case, this concern is likely to be mitigated. Moreover, robustness 
checks to endogeneity confirm the validity of the results. 
We are aware of alternative ways of estimating dynamic impacts but, as we will explain, those are 
inferior options. The first possible alternative would be to estimate a Panel Vector Autoregression 
(PVAR). However, this is generally considered a “back-box” since all relevant regressors are 
considered endogenous. Moreover, one has to know the exact order in which they enter in the system. 
Since economic theory rarely provides such an ordering, the Choleski decomposition is often used as a 
solution of limited value for providing structural information to a VAR. Moreover, a major limitation 
of the VAR approach is that it has to be estimated to low order systems. Since all effects of omitted 
variables will be in the residuals, this may lead to big distortions in the IRFs, making them of little use 
for structural interpretations (see e.g. Hendry 1995). In addition, all measurement errors or 
misspecifications will also induce unexplained information left in the error terms, making 
interpretations of the IRFs even more difficult (Ericsson et al., 1997). One should bear in mind that due 
to its limited number of variables and the aggregate nature of the shocks, a VAR model should be 
viewed as an approximation to a larger structural system. In contrast, the approach used here does not 
suffer from these identification and size-limitation problems and, in fact, has been suggested by 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), inter alia, as a sufficiently flexible alternative. 
A second alternative of assessing the dynamic impact of fiscal consolidation episodes would be to 
estimate an Autoregressive-Distributed-Lag (ARDL) model of changes in markups and compute the 
                                                 




IRFs from the estimated coefficients (Romer and Romer, 1989; and Cerra and Saxena, 2008). Note that 
the IRFs obtained using this method, however, tend to be lag-sensitive, therefore undermining the 
overall stability of the IRFs. Moreover, the statistical significance of long-lasting effects can result 
from one-type-of-shock models, particularly when the dependent variable is very persistent (Cai and 
Den Haan, 2009). Contrarily, in the local projection method we do not experience such issue since 
lagged dependent variables enter as control variables and are not used to derive the IRFs. Lastly, 
estimated IRFs’ confidence intervals are computed directly using the standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients without the need for Monte Carlo simulations. 
In order to explore whether changes in fiscal variables to negative price shocks vary depending on 
the phase of the business cycle, the following alternative regression will be estimated: 
 (4) 
with  (see Auerbach and Gorodichenko, 2013), where z is an indicator 
of the state of the economy (using the real GDP growth rate) normalized to have zero mean and unit 
variance. The remainder of the variables and coefficients are defined as in Equation (3). This method is 
equivalent to Granger and Teravistra’s (1993) smooth transition autoregressive model and has two 
main advantages. First, relative to estimating VARs for each regime it uses a larger number of 
observations based on a continuum of states to estimate the IRFs, thus increasing stability and 
precision.  Secondly, in contrast with a model where each dependent variable is interacted with a proxy 
for the business cycle, this method makes it possible to directly test whether the effect of deflation 
episodes on fiscal variables varies across different regimes such as expansions and recessions.  
 
b) Panel Data Approach 
We estimate the following panel regression: 
 
1 1 1
1 1 2 3 4
0 0 0
it it t i it j it j j it l k it k it
j l k
F F g ie Dα δ γ α α α α ε− − − −
= = =
∆ = + + + ∆ + + + +∑ ∑ ∑  (5) 
where itF is a fiscal aggregate of interest, itg is the real GDP growth rate, itie  is the real effective 
interest rate and itD is our deflation variable which can take the form of either negative inflation rate or 
a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the inflation rate is negative. ,t iδ γ  denote time and country 
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effects, respectively. itε is a disturbance term satisfying standard conditions of zero mean and constant 
variance. 
Equation (5) is initially estimated with panel fixed effects. However, we are aware of the 
challenges related to the potential reverse causality between fiscal aggregates and price changes since 
budget deficits have a determining role in the formation of the inflation level. Hence, following the 
literature, we resort to the Generalized Method of Moment estimation (which takes advantage of the 
lagged structure of the data) as a way to address this as well as endogeneity and omitted bias problems. 
While good instruments are hard to find, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2013) and Fatas and Mihov 
(2013) and make use of lags of the different regressors as well as the constraints on the executive 
(retrieved from the Database of Political Institutions) which capture the potential veto points on the 
decisions of the government. 
 
4. Data 
We focus on a panel of 17 economies (selected based on data availability) in the first wave of 
globalization, that is, between 1870 and 1914.9 We use the CPI-based inflation rate and real GDP 
growth rate from Bordo and Filardo (2005). When observations are missing, we resort to Warren 
Weber’s dataset, that includes information on output and prices for many countries starting in 1810.10 
We define deflation as negative inflation and include two measures of low inflation: one corresponding 
to inflation rates between 0 and 2 percent (“lowflation 1”) and a second corresponding to inflation rates 
between 0 and 1 percent (“lowflation 2”).  
As far as fiscal aggregates are concerned, debt ratios come from Abbas et al. (2010) while other 
fiscal variables such as government revenues, primary expenditure, interest payments (which allows 
the computation of effective interest rates) and primary balance come from Mauro et al. (2013).  
Additional controls such as the nominal interest rate (used to compute the interest rate growth 
differential), trade openness (exports and imports over GDP), a measure of broad money and the 
exchange rate come from Bordo et al. (2001). Political and institutional variables (constraints on the 
executive and the polity2 index) come from Polity IV project whose data coverage begins in 1800. 
 
                                                 
9 The country list is: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. 
10 www.minneapolisfed.org/research/economists/wewproj.cfm#intldata  
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We begin by plotting, for each country, the time profile of CPI inflation rate to inspect visually the 
episodes of deflation between 1870 and 1914. In Figure 1 we observe that, contrarily to the post-WWII 
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experience, deflation was a relatively common phenomenon in the late 1800s and early 1900s. More 
precisely, defining a deflation episode simply as years of negative inflation, Table A1 in the Appendix 
shows that our sample between 1870-1914 experienced 297 years combined of deflation, 
corresponding to 146 episodes (each lasting an average of about 2 years). Portugal and Spain 
experienced the largest number of deflationary episodes (13 in total) over the period under 
consideration, while Finland experienced the smallest (four in total). 
We further differentiate between deflationary episodes associated with recessions or expansions 
in economy activity. Following Borio and Filardo (2004, 2005) we adopt three generic deflation 
categories: good deflations, that result from positive supply shocks; bad deflations, that are correlated 
with recessions; and ugly deflations, that stand for periods of steep decreases in prices linked with 
acute recessions. Without controlling for any other variable, the median debt ratios seem to have gone 
up during deflations, particularly if the economy was in a recession. Revenues increase during 
deflation and the same is true for primary expenditure. Note, however, that, historical data relate only 
to ex-post outturns and include discretionary policy actions put in place in the face of deflation. 
Consequently, underlying trends are difficult to identify. The increase in expenditures is higher than 
that of revenues, yielding a decline in primary balances with is particularly affected if the economy is 
in a slump. In the next section, we discuss the main results of our analysis. 
[Table 1] 
 
5. Empirical Results 
a. Local Projection Impulse Responses  
Starting with the debt-to-GDP ratio, the resulting IRFs stemming from estimating the baseline 
equation (3) are displayed in Figure 2. The debt ratio rises following a shock in deflation (that is, a 
decline in prices) and the effect is statistically significant up to 2 years after the impact (t=0). The 
impact of a shock to “lowflation 1” (define as inflation rates between 0 and 2 percent), on the contrary, 
leads to a fall in the debt ratio. Using a stricter definition of low inflation, that is, “lowflation 2”, the 
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Note: Dotted lines equal one standard error confidence bands. Seem main text for details. 
 
In order to check the robustness of the previous set of results, Equation (3) is re-estimated for 
the case of deflation11 by including only time effects to control for specific time shocks, as those 
affecting world interest rates. The results for this specification are shown in Figure 3 panel (a).  
Moreover, as shown by Tuelings and Zubanov (2010), a possible bias from estimating Equation (3) 
using country-fixed effects is that the error term of the equation may have a non-zero expected value, 
due to the interaction of fixed effects and country-specific price developments. This would lead to a 
bias of the estimates that is a function of k. To address this issue and further check the robustness of 
our findings, Equation (3) was re-estimated by excluding both country and time fixed effects from the 
analysis. The results reported in Figure 3 panel (b) suggest that this bias is negligible (the difference in 
the point estimate is small and not statistically significant). 
Estimates of the impact of deflation on the debt ratio could be biased because of endogeneity, 
as unobserved factors influencing the dynamics of prices may also affect the probability of the 
occurrence of a deflation episode. Therefore, Equation (3) was augmented to control for the real GDP 
growth rate and the effective interest rate. The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 3 panel (c) 
and confirm the robustness of the previous findings.  
In addition, in order to deal with endogeneity concerns we re-estimate Equation (3) by means 
of a GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995). This estimator is particularly relevant when series 
are very persistent and the lagged levels may be weak instruments in the first differences. In this case, 
lagged values of the first differences can be used as valid instruments in the equation in levels and 
                                                 
11 Results for lowflation1 and lowflation2 are available upon request. 
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efficiency is increased by running Equation (3) by means of a system GMM estimator.12 Results in 
Figure 3 panel (d) are qualitatively in line with our previous findings. 
 
Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions of debt-to-GDP ratio to deflation episodes, robustness  
(PCSE and GMM estimations) 
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Note: Dotted lines equal one standard error confidence bands. Seem main text for details. In panel c) controls include real 
GDP growth rate and the effective interest rate. 
 
As an additional sensitivity check, Equation (3) was re-estimated for different lags (l) of 
changes in the dependent variable. The results (not shown for reasons of parsimony but are available 
upon request) confirm that previous findings are not sensitive to the choice of the number of lags.  
 In Figure 4 we replace the debt ratio by other fiscal variables. A decrease in the general price 
level leads to an immediate rise in revenues and a medium term decline in primary expenditures, 
resulting in an improvement of the primary balance. Given that the deflation impact on the debt ratio is 
positive, this effect can only be explained (in face of Equation 2) by the positive effect to a decline in 
prices stemming from the interest rate-growth differential (as we observe in panel d). 
                                                 
12 The list of instruments includes the first and second lags of all the right-hand-side variables as well as constraints on the 
executive. The null of Hansen J-test for over-identifying restrictions is not rejected, meaning that the model specification is 
correct and all over-identified instruments are exogenous. The tests for serial correlation also point to the absence of 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals.  
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Note: Dotted lines equal one standard error confidence bands. Seem main text for details. 
 
Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions to deflation episodes, contingent on the phase of the 
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To explore whether the deflationary effect on fiscal variables varies depending on the phase of 
the business cycle, we estimate Equation (4) for debt, revenues, primary expenditures and primary 
balances. Results in Figure 5, suggest that the rise in the debt ratio is statistically significant higher in 
bad times; in good times despite deflation, debt actually falls. Revenues (primary expenditures) rise 
(fall) following a deflation shock if the economy is booming, leading to an improvement in the budget 
position. 
In order to control for additional relevant country features, we now assess whether the effect of 
deflation episodes on fiscal aggregates depends on countries’ structural and policy variables: the level 
of economic development (real GDP per capita), country size (population), trade openness (exports 
plus imports over GDP) and institutional quality (polity2).  
Highly distorted trade policies especially policies that create a heavy bias against exports 
increase a country’s indebtedness. Borrowing to finance public expenditures partly account for the big 
rise in growth of external debt (Paesani, Strauch and Kremer, 2006). 
The more frequently coalitions or ruling parties change, the higher the propensity of a 
government to accumulate debt (Alesina et al. 1993; Poterba, 1994; Hallerberg and Strauch, 2002). 
Countries characterized by a short average tenure of government have a tendency to expand debt 
(Roubini and Sachs, 1989). 
It is also important to control for country size, since higher automatic stabilizers reduce fiscal 
multipliers and the larger economies tend to be able to have higher automatic responses to the business 
cycle (Batini et al., 2014). In addition, economies with lower propensity to import have higher fiscal 
multipliers because of fewer demand leakage via imports (Barrell et al., 2012). 
To this end, Equation (3) is re-estimated using structural/policy variables’ 2nd quartile as the 













Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions to deflation episodes, the role of structural and policy 
factors (PCSE estimations) 
Level of Development (real GDP per capita) 
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Note: Dotted lines equal one standard error confidence bands. Seem main text for details. 
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Looking at Figure 6, first row, countries with a lower development level experience a higher 
impact of debt to a fall in general prices. The difference in the effects of falling prices on revenue 
between high and low real GDP per capita levels is not statistically significant from one another.  
More (less) open economies experience a decline (rise) in the debt ratio following a negative 
shock in prices. Revenue ratios also behave favourably the more open an economy is (the effect is not 
statistically different from zero from relatively closed economies). 
Countries with better institutions (proxying for better checks and balances, political 
competition, less corruption, etc.) do not see their debt ratios rise following a decline in prices. 
Countries with weak institutions however, do get higher debt ratios as a reaction to deflation. 
Democracy and political accountability seem to work towards increased efforts in cutting primary 
expenditures ratios in the medium term following price declines, an effect that is less mitigated in the 
case of worse institutional settings.  
Finally, the larger the country the bigger the rise in debt ratios after a negative shock to prices. 
Moreover, revenues (primary expenditures) rise (fall) more following a deflation shock in larger 
(smaller) countries. 
 
b. Panel Analysis 
The results of the baseline regression on the impact of negative inflation on debt ratios are 
displayed in Table 2, column 1. We see that a 1 percent fall in prices leads to an increase in the debt 
ratio of about 0.29 pp. There is some persistence as indicated by the lagged regressor (magnitude of 
around 0.16 pp). In column 2 we add some controls and observe that higher GDP growth lowers the 
debt ratio, but a rise in the effective interest rate increases it. Both effects are in line with the 
theoretical predications. The effect of 1 percent deflation corresponds now to an increase in the debt 
ratio of about 0.30-0.32 pp accounting for trade openness, monetary policy and the exchange rate 
raises the absolute value of the coefficient on deflation. Turning to revenues, the contemporaneous 
effect of deflation does not seem to have a statistically significant impact regardless of the set of 
controls included. Its lag, however, yields a statistically significant negative coefficient. This means 
that a fall of 1 percent in the price level leads to a rise in the revenue to GDP ratio of about 0.03-0.04 
pp, a rather marginally small effect. This could be seen as a reverse Olivera-Tanzi effect, when high 
inflation in an economy results in a decline in the volume of tax collection. Primary expenditures are 
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relatively invariant to changes in prices. Both these effects combined, lead to a positive impact of 
deflation of primary balance, in the order of 0.05 pp for a 1 percent decline in the inflation rate.  
 [Table 2] 
 
In Table 3 we repeat the same exercise, but now instead of the actual negative inflation values, 
we replace our main regressor by a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the inflation rate is 
negative and zero otherwise. This exercise is easily comparable to the analysis of the IRFs done in 
section 5.a), and looking at the debt ratio, and yields similar results as before, since the deflation 
dummy has a positive and statistically significant impact in all four specifications. The remaining 
regressors retain the previous signs and significance. Yet again, for revenues only the lagged dummy 




Next, we take the specification equivalent to (2), (6), (10) and (14), respectively for debt, 
revenues, primary expenditures and primary balance and include both deflation and our first measure 
of low inflation together.13 A 1 percent decline in prices leads to a 0.22 pp increase in debt ratio and a 
0.05 pp increase in primary balance (see Table 4). Estimation by difference GMM is qualitatively 
unchanged for the case of primary balance and while the deflation impact on contemporaneous debt 
disappears, the lagged effect is considerably larger in absolute terms. Note that the null of Hansen J-
test for over-identifying restrictions is not rejected, meaning that the model specification is correct and 
all over-identified instruments are exogenous. The tests for serial correlation also point to the absence 
of second-order serial correlation in the residuals 
[Table 4] 
 
In Table 5 we redo the analysis but estimating by difference GMM specifications where 
deflation and our measure “lowflation1” are included separately. The contemporaneous impact of 
deflation increases the primary balance while low inflation seems to affect only revenues. The lag 
                                                 




deflation coefficient however, is statistically significant in the cases of debt and revenue ratios. A 1 
percent decline in prices leads to a 0.32 pp and 0.07 pp increase in debt and revenue ratios, 
respectively.  
 [Table 5] 
 
In Table 6 we include the interaction between our deflation variables (either negative inflation rate 
or the dummy variable) and positive/negative real GDP growth rates. The debt ratio seems to increase 
when deflation is also associated with an economic recession.14   
 Looking at panel b), we also observe that revenue ratios fall in reaction to a price decline 
shock particularly during bad times. Primary expenditures, on the contrary, seem to decrease when 
deflation is associated with growth in real GDP. 
[Table 6] 
 
We now move away from fiscal ratios to inspecting the impact of deflation on nominal fiscal 
levels.  In fact, the analysis of fiscal variables expressed in percent of GDP points to the fact that the 
denominator effect is more important for the results, and some of the impact of deflation on the 
numerator (the nominal fiscal variable) may therefore be muted.  Following End et al. (2015), we build 
“pseudo-nominal” changes in the fiscal variable x=X/Y by means of the following formula for our 




[(1 )(1 ) 1]xit








∆ = = ∆ + + + − . (6) 
The change corrected from the denominator effect, a itx∆ , proxies the nominal increase, as measured 
in terms of previous year GDP, where tπ  corresponds to the change in the GDP deflator, and g denotes 
the real GDP growth rate. Re-estimating equation (3) with the newly created “pseudo-nominal” 
changes gives us the results displayed in Table 7. As before, nominal debt rises to falling prices and the 
                                                 





same is true for both nominal revenues and nominal primary expenditures. Results are consistent 
between panels a) and b), that is, whether we use fixed effects or difference GMM estimations.  
[Table 7] 
 
Finally, we check if our previous results are robust to the use of episodes of deflation (defined as 
years of negative inflation), instead of annual observations of negative inflation rate or a dummy 
variable approach. More specifically, we take the 146 deflation episodes in a cross-section regression 
where all the relevant regressors are averaged over the corresponding episode period. We display in 
Table 8 the results from this OLS regression. In this case, deflation episodes contribute to increase 





 Lessons from the past, notably from the fiscal consequences of deflation in the Golden Age of 
Globalization, are relevant in terms of current and recent fiscal and price developments in several 
economies. Therefore, in this paper we have used a panel of 17 economies, in the the decades before 
World War I, between 1870 and 1914, to study the fiscal consequences of deflation.  
Our results show that a 1 percent fall in prices leads to an increase in the debt ratio of about 0.23-
0.32 pp accounting for trade openness, monetary policy and the exchange rate raises the absolute value 
of the coefficient on deflation. Moreover, the debt ratio increases when deflation is also associated 
with an economic recession. For government revenue, lagged deflation comes out with a statistically 
significant negative coefficient, while government primary expenditure seems relatively invariant to 
changes in prices. Interestingly, countries with better institutions do not see their debt ratios rise 
following a decline in prices. On the other hand, the debt ratio increases when deflation is also 
associated with an economic recession. In addition, estimations by difference GMM are qualitatively 
unchanged vis-à-vis the baseline results. 
Even though we are able to find relevant results and some insightful policy indications, one has to 
bear in mind that changes in fiscal aggregates are not purged from discretionary actions reacting to 
deflation, and also that today’s economies have undergone through a series of structural reforms that 
warrants caution in comparing past experiences. Moreover, one has to be careful in drawing links 
20 
 
between our analysis period and current times, given both the smaller size of the government, and also 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Changes in Debt, Revenue, Primary Expenditure and Primary 
Balance 
 








ΔDebt (% GDP) Min -12.45 -38.83 -1.95 ΔRevenue (% 
GDP) 
Min -4.99 -4.99 -2.61 
 Q1 -0.74 -1.25 -0.04  Q1 -0.20 -0.25 -0.20 
 Median 0.53 -0.29 1.66  Median 0.07 0.01 0.12 
 Q3 2.69 1.75 3.38  Q3 0.34 0.34 0.82 
 Max 9.89 11.16 20.12  Max 3.63 3.20 3.63 











Min -3.53 -3.53 -2.64 ΔPrimary 
balance 
(%GDP) 
Min -13.22 -13.22 -3.66 
 Q1 -0.23 -0.33 -0.05  Q1 -0.24 -0.23 -0.49 
 Median 0.07 0.03 0.15  Median -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 
 Q3 0.34 0.34 0.55  Q3 0.26 0.35 0.19 
 Max 14.78 14.78 3.58  Max 3.11 3.11 1.47 





Table 2: Baseline regression on the fiscal impact of deflation value - fixed effects 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Dep. 
Variable  
d.debt_gdp d.rev_gdp d.pexp_gdp d.pbal_gdp 
                 
LD.debt_gdp 0.189*** 0.296*** 0.134** 0.123**             
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.054) (0.057)             
growth  -0.291*** -0.319*** -0.302***  -0.025*** -0.014 -0.012  -0.036*** -0.020 -0.011  0.012 0.006 -0.002 
  (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
L.growth  0.139*** -0.006 0.030  0.012 0.003 0.004  -0.009 -0.028* -0.017  0.025** 0.035** 0.025 
  (0.053) (0.056) (0.056)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
eirate  1.854*** 1.956*** 1.948***  0.295*** 0.305*** 0.360***  1.021*** 1.660*** 1.643***  -0.719*** -1.375*** -1.296*** 
  (0.450) (0.474) (0.475)  (0.079) (0.080) (0.079)  (0.112) (0.136) (0.133)  (0.108) (0.140) (0.139) 
L.eirate  -1.118** -0.937 -0.408  -0.260*** -0.185* -0.207**  -0.983*** -1.548*** -1.306***  0.712*** 1.371*** 1.092*** 
  (0.487) (0.603) (0.600)  (0.084) (0.100) (0.095)  (0.119) (0.168) (0.160)  (0.115) (0.173) (0.166) 
deflnumber -0.287*** -0.227*** -0.325*** -0.302*** -0.019 -0.014 -0.022 -0.022 0.000 0.031 0.025 0.024 -0.023 -0.045** -0.043 -0.042 
 (0.079) (0.085) (0.096) (0.098) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) 
L.deflnumber -0.135* -0.145* -0.082 -0.065 -0.032** -0.042*** -0.035** -0.035** -0.009 -0.031 -0.041 -0.047* -0.029 -0.013 0.002 0.009 
 (0.077) (0.081) (0.097) (0.098) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.028) 
openness   -0.150 -0.176*   -0.017 -0.008   -0.021 -0.029   0.006 0.021 
   (0.101) (0.097)   (0.017) (0.017)   (0.029) (0.028)   (0.030) (0.030) 
M2 growth   0.177***    0.002    0.019**    -0.018*  
   (0.032)    (0.005)    (0.009)    (0.010)  
Exchange rate   1.785 1.149   -0.178 -0.206   -0.336 -0.378   0.148 0.170 
   (1.115) (1.140)   (0.186) (0.187)   (0.318) (0.316)   (0.328) (0.329) 
M2 (%GDP)    0.080**    0.004    0.017*    -0.015 
    (0.032)    (0.005)    (0.009)    (0.009) 
LD.rev_gdp     -0.348*** -0.355*** -0.266*** -0.272***         
     (0.039) (0.040) (0.053) (0.053)         
LD.pexp_gdp         -0.301*** -0.265*** -0.215*** -0.226***     
         (0.057) (0.053) (0.074) (0.074)     
LD.pbal_gdp             -0.316*** -0.357*** -0.392*** -0.371*** 
             (0.060) (0.058) (0.077) (0.077) 
Constant -1.283* -2.674** -5.209** -8.556*** -0.187 -0.233 -0.189 -0.436 -0.020 0.135 0.183 -1.070 -0.182 -0.381 -0.352 0.725 
 (0.721) (1.267) (2.066) (2.976) (0.124) (0.225) (0.339) (0.469) (0.191) (0.322) (0.582) (0.798) (0.175) (0.312) (0.600) (0.832) 
                 
Observations 591 527 341 350 586 523 340 348 523 521 340 348 523 521 340 348 
R-squared 0.081 0.220 0.312 0.260 0.143 0.230 0.192 0.202 0.066 0.242 0.401 0.394 0.072 0.162 0.316 0.288 
Note: The dependent variable corresponds to the first difference of fiscal aggregate in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions include country and 




Table 3: Baseline regression on the fiscal impact of deflation dummy - fixed effects 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Dep. 
Variable  
d.debt_gdp d.rev_gdp d.pexp_gdp d.pbal_gdp 
                 
LD.debt_gdp 0.066 0.301*** 0.144*** 0.134**             
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.054) (0.057)             
growth  -0.288*** -0.320*** -0.299***  -0.024*** -0.015* -0.013  -0.037*** -0.022 -0.013  0.013 0.007 -0.000 
  (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
L.growth  0.141*** -0.001 0.039  0.012 0.002 0.004  -0.009 -0.028* -0.017  0.026** 0.035** 0.024 
  (0.053) (0.056) (0.056)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
eirate  1.861*** 1.913*** 1.895***  0.301*** 0.315*** 0.366***  1.025*** 1.663*** 1.642***  -0.718*** -1.369*** -1.291*** 
  (0.449) (0.472) (0.474)  (0.079) (0.080) (0.079)  (0.112) (0.136) (0.134)  (0.108) (0.140) (0.139) 
L.eirate  -1.032** -1.024* -0.367  -0.266*** -0.191* -0.206**  -0.957*** -1.494*** -1.229***  0.682*** 1.319*** 1.022*** 
  (0.488) (0.614) (0.599)  (0.084) (0.103) (0.096)  (0.119) (0.173) (0.162)  (0.115) (0.178) (0.167) 
is_deflnew 1.530*** 1.179*** 1.675*** 1.551*** 0.116 0.054 0.031 0.033 -0.056 -0.206** -0.139 -0.139 0.164 0.264*** 0.151 0.158 
 (0.570) (0.409) (0.427) (0.432) (0.080) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071) (0.205) (0.104) (0.124) (0.122) (0.216) (0.100) (0.127) (0.126) 
L.is_deflnew 0.561 0.100 -0.071 -0.265 0.172** 0.212*** 0.139* 0.149** -0.014 0.090 0.041 0.020 0.184 0.124 0.101 0.131 
 (0.573) (0.409) (0.431) (0.441) (0.080) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.204) (0.103) (0.124) (0.123) (0.215) (0.100) (0.127) (0.128) 
openness   -0.146 -0.171*   -0.015 -0.007   -0.019 -0.026   0.005 0.020 
   (0.100) (0.097)   (0.017) (0.017)   (0.029) (0.028)   (0.030) (0.030) 
M2 growth   0.178***    0.002    0.018*    -0.017*  
   (0.032)    (0.005)    (0.009)    (0.010)  
Exchange rate   1.819 1.220   -0.179 -0.207   -0.337 -0.374   0.145 0.161 
   (1.110) (1.135)   (0.187) (0.187)   (0.319) (0.317)   (0.328) (0.329) 
M2 (%GDP)    0.078**    0.004    0.017*    -0.014 
    (0.032)    (0.005)    (0.009)    (0.009) 
LD.rev_gdp     -0.343*** -0.359*** -0.263*** -0.270***         
     (0.038) (0.040) (0.053) (0.053)         
LD.pexp_gdp         -0.359*** -0.269*** -0.217*** -0.228***     
         (0.043) (0.053) (0.074) (0.074)     
LD.pbal_gdp             -0.251*** -0.361*** -0.397*** -0.376*** 
             (0.044) (0.058) (0.077) (0.077) 
Constant -1.683 -2.952** -5.081** -8.621*** -0.245 -0.277 -0.191 -0.431 0.034 0.106 0.110 -1.145 -0.268 -0.402 -0.288 0.801 
 (1.087) (1.264) (2.064) (2.960) (0.150) (0.224) (0.342) (0.470) (0.370) (0.321) (0.586) (0.801) (0.389) (0.309) (0.602) (0.830) 
                 
Observations 633 527 341 350 622 523 340 348 559 521 340 348 559 521 340 348 
R-squared 0.029 0.217 0.319 0.266 0.132 0.230 0.186 0.198 0.119 0.242 0.398 0.389 0.063 0.169 0.315 0.289 
Note: The dependent variable corresponds to the first difference of fiscal aggregate in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions include country and 




Table 4: Regression on the fiscal impact of deflation and lowflation value included together – 
fixed effects and difference GMM 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Variable  d.debt_gdp d.rev_gdp d.pexp_gdp d.pbal_gdp d.debt_gdp d.rev_gdp d.pexp_gdp d.pbal_gdp 
Estimator  Fixed effects Difference GMM 
LD.debt_gdp 0.297***    0.184***    
 (0.044)    (0.061)    
growth -0.293*** -0.025*** -0.036*** 0.011 -0.446*** -0.037** -0.090*** -0.003 
 (0.051) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.094) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) 
L.growth 0.140*** 0.012 -0.009 0.026** 0.179* 0.002 -0.029 0.043* 
 (0.053) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.100) (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) 
eirate 1.872*** 0.300*** 1.021*** -0.713*** 2.933*** 0.245 0.402* -1.081*** 
 (0.452) (0.079) (0.113) (0.109) (0.956) (0.151) (0.206) (0.167) 
L.eirate -1.138** -0.266*** -0.983*** 0.705*** -1.348 -0.253 -0.587*** 0.829*** 
 (0.490) (0.084) (0.119) (0.116) (0.982) (0.165) (0.211) (0.202) 
deflnumber -0.219** -0.013 0.034 -0.046** -0.176 0.002 0.018 -0.064* 
 (0.088) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.142) (0.027) (0.037) (0.035) 
L.deflnumber -0.151* -0.044*** -0.029 -0.018 -0.380*** -0.055** -0.026 -0.035 
 (0.084) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.137) (0.026) (0.033) (0.034) 
lowf1number -0.161 -0.041 -0.037 -0.018 -0.102 -0.364** -0.019 -0.137 
 (0.407) (0.073) (0.104) (0.100) (0.856) (0.166) (0.227) (0.232) 
L.lowf1number 0.128 0.045 -0.030 0.085 1.082 -0.178 -0.258 0.387* 
 (0.402) (0.072) (0.103) (0.100) (0.849) (0.160) (0.252) (0.222) 
LD.rev_gdp  -0.352***    -0.350***   
  (0.041)    (0.047)   
LD.pexp_gdp   -0.264***    -0.288***  
   (0.054)    (0.059)  
LD.pbal_gdp    -0.357***    -0.366*** 
    (0.058)    (0.062) 
Observations 527 523 521 521 511 507 506 506 
R-squared 0.221 0.231 0.242 0.164     
ar1p     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
sarganp     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ar2p     0.766 0.140 0.531 0.112 
Note: The dependent variable corresponds to the first difference of fiscal aggregate in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Regressions include country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. *,**,*** denote statistical significant at the 






Table 5: Regression on the fiscal impact of deflation and lowflation value included separately – 
difference GMM 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Variable  d.debt_gdp d.debt_gdp d.rev_gdp d.rev_gdp d.pexp_gdp d.pexp_gdp d.pbal_gdp d.pbal_gdp 
LD.debt_gdp 0.174*** 0.166***       
 (0.060) (0.060)       
growth -0.443*** -0.456*** -0.031* -0.038** -0.092*** -0.090*** 0.005 -0.009 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
L.growth 0.164* 0.151 0.009 -0.002 -0.022 -0.027 0.037* 0.035 
 (0.098) (0.096) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) 
eirate 2.769*** 3.143*** 0.263* 0.225 0.405** 0.363* -1.110*** -0.998*** 
 (0.941) (0.909) (0.149) (0.144) (0.206) (0.193) (0.164) (0.161) 
L.eirate -1.167 -0.425 -0.260 -0.101 -0.576*** -0.516*** 0.830*** 0.924*** 
 (0.965) (0.905) (0.163) (0.151) (0.210) (0.197) (0.200) (0.190) 
deflnumber -0.167  -0.019  0.011  -0.065**  
 (0.128)  (0.025)  (0.033)  (0.033)  
L.deflnumber -0.323**  -0.066***  -0.033  -0.023  
 (0.128)  (0.024)  (0.032)  (0.033)  
lowf1number  -0.630  -0.379**  0.026  -0.280 
  (0.781)  (0.158)  (0.210)  (0.220) 
L.lowf1number  0.188  -0.262*  -0.274  0.294 
  (0.789)  (0.154)  (0.243)  (0.216) 
LD.rev_gdp   -0.350*** -0.361***     
   (0.046) (0.047)     
LD.pexp_gdp     -0.273*** -0.293***   
     (0.057) (0.059)   
LD.pbal_gdp       -0.359*** -0.380*** 
       (0.061) (0.062) 
Observations 511 511 507 507 506 506 506 506 
ar1p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
sarganp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ar2p 0.878 0.730 0.510 0.058 0.508 0.541 0.163 0.059 
Note: The dependent variable corresponds to the first difference of fiscal aggregate in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 





Table 6: Regression on the fiscal impact of deflation during economic expansions and recessions - 
difference GMM 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Variable  d.debt_gdp d.debt_gdp d.rev_gdp d.rev_gdp d.pexp_gdp d.pexp_gdp d.pbal_gdp d.pbal_gdp 
a) Inflation number          
defgrowthnumber -0.694  -0.012  -0.035  -0.034  
 (0.559)  (0.034)  (0.049)  (0.047)  
L.defgrowthnumber 0.765  -0.057*  -0.040  -0.033  
 (0.517)  (0.031)  (0.041)  (0.045)  
defrecessionnumber  -0.234  0.089  0.125  0.093 
  (0.173)  (0.103)  (0.128)  (0.142) 
L.defrecessionnumber  -0.464***  -0.016  0.068  0.061 
  (0.159)  (0.109)  (0.144)  (0.147) 
b) Inflation dummies         
deflgrowth 2.003  0.199  -0.869**  0.391  
 (1.755)  (0.200)  (0.422)  (0.241)  
L.deflgrowth -1.646  0.559***  -0.807*  0.561**  
 (1.804)  (0.191)  (0.465)  (0.245)  
deflrecession  1.292  -0.865**  0.164  0.061 
  (1.046)  (0.386)  (0.243)  (0.441) 
L.deflrecession  2.580***  -0.074  0.160  0.352 
  (0.949)  (0.378)  (0.240)  (0.465) 
Note: The dependent variable corresponds to the first difference of fiscal aggregate in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 





Table 7: Regression on the fiscal impact of deflation and low inflation in nominal terms (adjusted 
variables) – fixed effects and difference GMM 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Variable  d.debt_adj d.debt_adj d.rev_adj d.rev_adj d.pexp_adj d.pexp_adj d.pbal_adj d.pbal_adj 
a) Fixed effects          
deflnumber 0.696***  0.101***  0.123***  -0.021  
 (0.093)  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.021)  
L.deflnumber -0.538***  -0.008  -0.007  -0.008  
 (0.094)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.020)  
lowf1number  -0.214  -0.030  0.025  -0.063 
  (0.463)  (0.074)  (0.104)  (0.097) 
L.lowf1number  0.277  0.057  -0.008  0.069 
  (0.457)  (0.074)  (0.104)  (0.097) 
b) Difference GMM         
deflnumber 0.953***  0.122***  0.150***  -0.028  
 (0.164)  (0.029)  (0.035)  (0.036)  
L.deflnumber -0.263  -0.025  -0.002  0.010  
 (0.181)  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.037)  
lowf1number  0.541  -0.117  0.387  -0.199 
  (1.059)  (0.199)  (0.261)  (0.233) 
L.lowf1number  1.561  0.099  0.108  0.340 
        (0.242) 
Note: The dependent variable corresponds to the first difference of fiscal aggregate in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Regressions include country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. *,**,*** denote statistical significant at the 






Table 8: Baseline regression on the fiscal impact of deflation episodes – cross-section 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable  debt_gdp rev pexp pbal 
     
growth -0.371*** -0.024 -0.041** 0.021 
 (0.086) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) 
eirate 0.478* 0.091* 0.017 0.068 
 (0.248) (0.050) (0.059) (0.061) 
deflnumber -0.182* 0.009 0.056** -0.043* 
 (0.096) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) 
Constant -0.814 -0.131 0.249 -0.354 
 (0.997) (0.201) (0.238) (0.243) 
     
Observations 108 107 105 104 
R-squared 0.208 0.056 0.099 0.052 
Note: The dependent variable corresponds to the first difference of fiscal aggregate in percent of GDP. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Regressions include country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. *,**,*** denote statistical significant at the 







Table A1. Episodes of Deflation by country, 1870-1914 
 
 
